

# Discussion of “Information Acquisition by Institutional Depositors during Bank Panic” by Chernykh and Mityakov

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    - Bank soundness also matters
- Theoretically, all relevant (Rochet and Vives 2004, Goldstein and Pauzner 2005)

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- Relevant, timely question — LCR
  - ① financial vs non-financial corporate
  - ② operational vs non-operational
  
- Not many systemic panics, not enough data, confounding effects
  - non-fundamental shocks
  - confidential data leakage
  - account-level deposit flows, *all* banks



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Q1 What information do depositors respond during the panic?

Q2 Do uninformed depositors learn from informed depositors' actions?

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  - connected: mixed
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- Interpretation: connected banks respond to private information, non-connected to public information

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- fundamental matters if borrowing from non-connected
- still need to check interest rates (interbank rates spiked...)

# Corporate depositors

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    - transparent:  $(-)^{**}$
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    - transparent:  $(-)^{**}$
    - suspicious:  $(+)^{**}$
  - use the opportunity window while available? internal capital market?
  - not connected: not much
- Response to public information (capital ratio)
  - weakly positive only for non-connected, suspicious
- Again, connected banks respond to private information (but differently)

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- non-operational deposits: ‘surplus’ money not needed for immediate daily activities
- operational deposits assumed to be stickier

# Rumors...

- Transparent connected firms net transfer
  - (-) to inside (negative) information
  - (+) to black list

→ rely more on inside information than rumors

# Information spillovers

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- non-connected banks have information advantage over non-connected firms
- Q1 information spillovers or systemic shock (liquidity hoarding, all banks withdrew)
- Q2 do non-connected banks know which banks are connected?

# Summary

- Unique, very detailed data
  - non-fundamental shock (fewer confounding factors)
  - interesting and novel results
    - do we understand operational deposits?
- Q information, or something else (relationship, internal capital market)?
- Q cross-group comparison - who's stickier (not conditioning on information)?