

Claim Dilution in the Municipal Debt Market

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
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Research Question


- ▶ Investigate changes in bank loan shares of municipal debts in response to shocks
- ▶ Understand the debt dilution problem in the municipal debt market
- ▶ Study inter-creditor conflict problem

Local Debts Growing Over Time

State and Local Government Liability Credit Market Instrument /
Nominal GDP



Bank Loans are Growing Faster



Source: Ivanov and Zimmermann (2017)


Municipal Bonds Have Lower Default Rates

	Moody's		S&P	
	<i>Municipal</i>	<i>Corporate</i>	<i>Municipal</i>	<i>Corporate</i>
Aaa/AAA	0.00	0.52	0.00	0.60
Aa/AA	0.06	0.52	0.00	1.50
A/A	0.03	1.29	0.23	2.91
Baa/BBB	0.13	4.64	0.32	10.29
Ba/BB	2.65	19.12	1.74	29.93
B/B	11.86	43.34	8.48	53.72
Caa-C/CCC-C	16.58	69.18	44.81	69.19
Investment Grade	0.07	2.09	0.20	4.14
Non-Invest Grade	4.29	31.37	7.37	42.35
All	0.10	9.70	0.29	12.98

Source: Municipal Bond Fairness Act (HR 6308).

Overall Defaults have Increased

Number of Defaults per Calendar Year, 1970-2016



Source: Moody's Investors Service

Methodology

- ▶ Identify potentially exogenous shocks to municipalities
- ▶ Permanent shock: population estimate revision (Suarez Serrato and Wingender (2016))
 - ▶ Census count minus population estimates
 - ▶ Population counts are related to federal funding
 - ▶ Shocks of different signs are included in regressions separately (asymmetric effects)
- ▶ Transitory shock:
 - ▶ Snow coverage
 - ▶ Revenue and service disruptions are costly to municipalities
- ▶ Regress variables of interests on these shocks with county controls
 - ▶ Bank shares, amount of bonds and bank loans, and share of term loans


Main Results

- ▶ Permanent negative shock increased bank share only in low income counties
 - ▶ Bonds decrease while bank loans increase
 - ▶ Effects have a two-year lag because of the delayed release time of revision
- ▶ Transitory shock increased bank share and credit line usage
 - ▶ But results are mostly weak (not statistically significant)

What are the stories?

- ▶ Most of the results are consistent with findings in the corporate debt market
 - ▶ e.g. Sufi (2009), Raugh and Sufi (2010), Colia, Ippolito, and Li (2013)
- ▶ What are the explanations?
 - ▶ Lower credit quality? (and heterogeneity of municipality in general)
 - ▶ Bank lenders provide monitoring benefits to other creditors
 - ▶ e.g. James (1987), Mikkelsen and Partch (1986)
 - ▶ Inter-creditor relationship and renegotiation costs
 - ▶ Billett (2016), Becker and Ivashina (2017), Berlin, Nini, and Yu (2018)
 - ▶ Financial constraints and market access

Overall Ratings have been Improving



The increase in A and Aa ratings since 2000 reflects the recalibration to a global rating scale in 2010 and not a fundamental shift in credit quality. The increase appears gradual instead of as a sudden shift because rating histories were also recalibrated. This affected all credits that were outstanding at the time of the recalibration, comprising about half of all ratings; any ratings that were withdrawn prior to the recalibration were not adjusted (See Municipal Ratings Performance Since the Recalibration of the US Municipal Scale).

Source: Moody's Investors Service


Municipality Debt Market

- ▶ What do we learn from studying the municipality debt market?
 - ▶ Different treatment in bankruptcy law
 - ▶ Territory vs states (e.g. Puerto Rico vs Detroit)
 - ▶ Tax exemption status
 - ▶ Tax advantage of bank debts vs bonds?
 - ▶ Difficulty to increase tax revenue or reduce expenditures
 - ▶ Other financial constraints?
 - ▶ Study the effects by counties with different levels of financial constraint

Other Comments

- ▶ What's the magnitude of the shocks in dollars?
- ▶ Tax reform and the ownership of municipal debts
 - ▶ Bergstresser and Cohen (2015)
- ▶ Ownership types can also matter
 - ▶ Bonds and loans are held by the same owners?
 - ▶ e.g. bank holding of bonds has increased
- ▶ Consequences of changing the mix of stake holders
- ▶ Performance over time
 - ▶ default rates by different bank/bond mixes

Changes in Bond Holdings Ownership



Source: Federal Reserve Board Financial Accounts of the United States. December 8, 2016 (2016: Q3 Release).

Summary

- ▶ Interesting and the shocks are very neat
- ▶ I enjoy reading it very much.
- ▶ Very useful especially when we are likely heading for more municipal debt defaults